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THE MCS CONTROVERSY: ADMISSIBILITY OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING MULTIPLE
CHEMICAL SENSITIVITY SYNDROME UNDER
THE DAUBER TREGIME

I. INTRODUCTION
The environmental illness known as multiple chemical sensitivity
syndrome ("MCS") is becoming an increasingly popular issue within
the legal community through a new breed of toxic tort litigation. In
attempting to secure a judgment for such an illness, plaintiffs face the
problem of proving a causal link between alleged negligence and
MCS. The refusal of judges to admit expert testimony regarding this
illness is the main obstacle in MCS litigation. Federal district court
judges in several jurisdictions refuse to allow expert testimony for
MCS, stating that the theory on which MCS is based is too unreliable.
The First Circuit has yet to consider the admissibility of expert testimony regarding MCS.1
MCS syndrome as discussed in this article is distinct from the
accepted medical diagnosis, chemical sensitivity. 2 The chemical sen-

sitivity diagnosis, as recognized by mainstream medicine, involves a
substantiated reaction after a patient has been exposed to a single
chemical, or small group of similar chemicals.' This type of chemical
sensitivity is testable as well as diagnosable. 4 As of yet, MCS has

Massachusetts state courts, which arguably follow the federal Dauber

standard, have also not been faced with this issue.
2

See Summers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Sys., 897 F. Supp. 533, 535 (E.D.

Okla. 1995) (discussing distinction between MCS and chemical sensitivity).

3 Id.at 540.
4 Id "[T]o objectively make such a diagnosis [for the recognized form of
chemical sensitivity] a doctor, [sic] would need to administer either a scratch test,
patch test, or a RAST test for IGantibodies." Id
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neither sustained testing under the scientific method nor been accepted by mainstream medicine.'
This article will explore the elusive illness known as MCS by defining and explaining the illness as well as problems an attorney may
face in assessing MCS as an injury. Additionally, a discussion of the
current state of MCS and the outlook for acceptance of the illness in
the medical, legal and political fields is included. Finally, this article
will consider whether the First Circuit and state courts that employ
the federal standard are likely to follow federal jurisdictions who have
rendered an opinion on this issue.
II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECITIVE OF MCS
In 1962, allergist Theron Randolph became the pioneer of what is
known today as MCS. 6 Randolph described patients' symptoms,
which were caused by urban chemical exposures, as a general allergic
syndrome.7 Randolph advised his patients to avoid the irritating
chemicals, and prescribed sauna therapy as well as vitamin and mineral supplements for treatment. This syndrome, Randolph believed,
was similar to an illness first diagnosed by Selye, the originator of

5 See infra notes 45, 57-60, 85-113 and accompanying text (discussing lack
of standard test to detect MCS and skepticism of MCS as a bona fide illness by
mainstream medicine).
6 Thomas L. Kurt, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities -A Syndrome
of
Pseudotoxicity Manifest As Exposure Perceived Symptoms, 33 J. TOXICOLOGY

101, 101 (1995).
7 Id.

3 Kelly Corbett, Comment, Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome:
OccupationalDisease or Work-Related Accident? 24 B.C. ENVTL.

AFF.

L.

REv.

395, 398 (1997). "The theory behind Randolph's practices was 'that ecologic[al]
illness is manifested as a reaction to environmental insults associated with air,
water, food, drugs, and our habitat as modified by individual susceptibility in
terms of specific adaptation of the patients reacting as a biologic unit."' Id
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stress-related physiologic studies, called stress orientated general adaptation syndrome. 9
At the turn of the century, a syndrome similar to MCS called
neurasthenia was a popular diagnosis.'° Exemplifying this syndrome
were individuals who were so intolerant of perfumes and other odors
they were unable to function in society." In the mid-i 970s, thoracic
surgeon William Rea, who was convinced of Randolph's theories,
established the Environmental Health Center, in Dallas, Texas, which
specializes in diagnosing and treating patients with MCS and other
environmental illnesses.12 Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and most of
the 1980s proponents of Randolph's theories called themselves "clinical ecologists."' 3 This title evolved in the mid-1980s to "environmental medical specialists."14 Environmental medical specialists are
the group of practitioners who diagnose and treat MCS.' 5 The
American Board of Environmental Medicine, a proponent of MCS,
boasts of having the support of thirty-one board-certified physicians
in 1989.16 Additionally, it claimed several thousand physician sympathizers based upon attendance at their conferences. 17
In 1991, Dr. Nicholas A. Ashford and Claudia S. Miller took the
MCS debate to a higher level. '8 This team chose to bring the issue of
MCS into the political regulatory arena, which determines the standards for public buildings, the workplace and occupational disability.19 Based on this effort, many established medical and research or-

9 Kurt, supranote 6, at 101.
10

Id

I1 Id
12 id
13

Id

Kurt, supra note 6, at 101.
15 Wendi J. Berkowitz, Multiple Chemical Sensibility in the Courtroom: Is
14

Them Life After Daubert, 63 DEF. CouNs. J. 483, 484 (1996).
16

Kurt, supra note 6, at 101.

17 Id
18 Id
19

Id
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ganizations have joined forces to study MCS. 20 Proponents of MCS
believe that these large research initiatives are a step toward universal
recognition of MCS as a viable illness. 2' Notwithstanding these research efforts, MCS remains a topic of great debate in the medical,
political, and legal arenas.
A. Definition of MCS
MCS is defined as "illness reactions associated with exposure to
more than one chemical, at significantly lower exposure levels than
would cause noticeable illness in the general population ....
, 22 The
theory is that exposures to different types of environmental factors
may depress a person's immune system to such a point that the exposed person develops multiple chemical sensitivities. 23 Specifically,
the exposure results in a hypersensitivity to most chemicals and organic substances.2 4 Although no clinical definition of MCS has
gained acceptance in the medical community, the most widely employed definition in the United States is set forth by Dr. Mark R.
Cullen, a professor of medicine and epidemiology at Yale University. 25 Incidentally, Cullen is credited with coining the title Multiple

20

Corbett, supra note 8, at 400. The National Research Counsel, the EPA,

the National Institute of Mental Health Sciences, the Agency for Toxic Substance
and Disease Registry, the Association of Occupational and Environmental
Clinics, and the Department of Veteran's Affairs all have contributed to the study
of MCS. Id
21 Id "These large research initiatives indicate that the government and
the
medical community are beginning to recognize MCS as a clinical illness." Id
22 Grace E. Ziem, Multiple Chemical Sensitivity: Treatment and Folio- up
With Avoidance and Controlof Chemical Exposures,8 TOXICOLOGY AND INDUS.
HEALTH 73, 73 (1992).
23 Summers, 897 F. Supp. at 535 (citing MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE,
at 73-74 (Fed. Judicial Center, 1994)).
24 Berkowitz, supra note 15, at 483.
25 Ann L. Davidoff & Penelope M. Keyl, Symptoms And Health Status In
Individuals With Multiple ChemicalSensitivities Syndrome From FourReported
Sensitizing Exposures And A General Population Comparison Group, 51
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Chemical Sensitivity.26 Cullen postulates that MCS is the designation
for those who meet the following criteria:
(1) the patient acquires the syndrome usually after the occurrence of a
clearly evident --although not necessarily serious-- health event
caused by environmental exposure, such as solvent intoxication, respiratory track irritation, pesticide poisoning, or sick building syndrome;
(2) the patient experiences multiple symptoms referable to several organ systems, almost always including the central nervous system; (3)
although there may be persistent complaints between exposures, the
patient's symptoms are characteristically and predictably precipitated
by a perceived environmental exposure; (4) the agents that may precipitate the patients symptoms are multiple and chemically diverse; (5)
the dose of these agents that precipitate symptoms are at lease two
orders of magnitude lower than the established thresholds for acute
health effects; (6) no test of physiologic function can explain the
symptoms and although there may be clinical abnormalities, such as
mild bronchospasm or neuropsychologic dysfunction, these are insufficient to explain the illness pattern; (7) no other27 organic disorder is
present that can explain the pattern of symptoms.
Although Cullen offers a detailed definition, it has not been
widely accepted. 2' Another frequently employed definition of MCS is
one which has been accepted and endorsed by the American College
of Occupational and Environmental Medicine.2 9 Among the variety

201, 201 (1996); See also Patricia J. Sparks et al.,
Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome: A Clinical Perspective I Case
ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH

Definition, Theories of Pathogenesis,and Research Needs, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL
MED. 718, 719 (1994).
26

Ronald E. Gots, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities-Public Policy,33 J.

TOXICOLOGY 111, 111 (1995).
27

Mark R. Cullen, Low-Level Environmental Exposures, In Workers With

Multiple Chemical Sensitivities, OCCUPATIONAL

MEDICINE: STATE OF THE ART

667, 670-672 (1987).
28 Davidoff& Keyl, supranote 25, at 201.
29 Frank v. State, 972 F. Supp. 130, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). "That definition

REVIEWS

includes the following elements:

(1) an initial, identifiable environmental

224

JOURNAL OF TRL4L & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. IV

of proposed definitions of MCS, all share several commonalties: (1)
the syndrome is a multisymptomatic disorder; (2) the syndrome affects various organ systems; and (3) the syndrome is the result of exposure to a level of various chemicals which is endurable by the majority of the population.3° Clinicians who actively research MCS have
found practical limitations with the various definitions proposed by
clinical ecologists. 31 The lack of an accepted definition has grave
consequences because it impedes research efforts; thus, MCS remains
indistinguishable from other defined illnesses.3 2 Further, the absence
of a well-accepted definition is one reason why trial judges have determined that expert testimony regarding MCS is unreliable thus refusing to admit this type of testimony.33
B. What CausesMCS?

The cause of MCS remains as equally elusive as its definition.
There are numerous theories to explain a pathophysiologic basis for
MCS. 34 Currently, there are two main schools of thought regarding
the cause of MCS: the biologic view and the psychologic view.35
The biologic view assimilates MCS with other allergic disorders and
sets forth the basis of MCS as a dysfunction of the immune, epithelial

exposure resulting in the onset of symptoms; (2) symptoms ranging among
multiple organ systems i.e. nervous and respiratory systems; (3) symptoms
recurring and abating in response to exposures to very low levels of diverse
chemicals; and (4) symptoms that cannot be accounted for by other medical
conditions." Id (citing E.E. Sikorski, et al., Roundtable Sunmary: The Question
of Multiple ChemicalSensitivity, 24 FUNDAM. APP. ToXiCOL. 22, 24 (1995)).
30 Frank,972 F. Supp. at 132 n.2.
31 Sparks et al., supra note 25, at 719.
32 Id.at 727.
33 See Summem, 897 F. Supp. at 536-37 (agreeing with American College of
Physicians about lack of MCS clinical definition).
34 Howard M. Sandler & Richard S. Blume, Beyond the MCS Debate, 59
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS 55, 55 (1997).
35 Cullen, supra note 27, at 670.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

19991

or central nervous system.36 The psychologic view is based on the
high rate of anxiety evident in patients with MCS in relation to the
rest of the population.37 Although these two views dominate, others
involved in MCS research have proposed additional causes for the
illness.38 Unfortunately, to date, no single theory has gained a majority of acceptance and so the cause of MCS remains in dispute.3 9
C The Innumerable Symptoms ofMCS
MCS is characterized by a constellation of nonspecific symptoms
unique to each patient.4 ° MCS sufferers report many common
symptoms including, but not limited to, unusual fatigue, difficulty in
4
thinking, impaired concentration, and short-term memory loss. '
Other frequently-occurring symptoms are headaches, upper or lower
respiratory irritation, and aching of the muscles and joints.42 Symptoms can also involve internal organs, including gastrointestinal and
cardiac symptoms (e.g., palpitations or an irregular heart beat).43
Unusual thirst is another common symptom. 44 The vast array of

36

Id.; See also Sparks et al., Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome: A

Clinical Perspective II: Evaluation, Diagnostic Testing, Treatment, and Social
Considerations,36 J.OCCUPATIONAL MED. 731, 732 (1994). "[Nlone of [the]
current views of [thel etiology of MCS is universally accepted on the basis of
substantial scientific evidence." Id.
37 Cullen, supranote 27, at 671.
38 Sparks, supra note 25, at 719. In addition to the biologic and psychologic

views two additional views of the etiology of MCS are:

(1) MCS is a

misdiagnosis of another illness; and (2) MCS is a manifestation of culturally
shaped illness behavior. Id.
39 Cullen, supra note 27, at 670-71.
40 Ziem, supra note 22, at 74.
41 Id.
42

id.

43 Id
44 id.
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symptoms MCS sufferers report contribute
to the theory that it is not
45
MCS.
for
test
adequately
to
possible
D. Treatmentsfor MCS
Proponents of MCS have set forth several possible treatments for
the illness. Despite the fact that the cause of MCS is unknown, patients can still seek relief from their symptoms. 46 Although advocates
of MCS agree that this illness is incurable, a belief consistent with the
basic principals of toxicology, they also agree that certain treatments
can lessen the symptoms of the illness. 47
Dr. Mark Cullen proposes the following treatment for every
MCS patient: (1) Education- it is critical for patients and their families to understand the illness and know that it is neither lethal nor curable; 48 (2) Support- including self-help groups and aiding sufferers in
returning to their daily activities;49 (3) Environmental modificationsimportant changes includes removal or reduction of the heaviest exposures that are associated with the onset of the illness; 50 and (4)
Economic support- if the illness impairs a person to the extent that
they cannot work, then they should apply for available benefits.5 The
most frequently proscribed treatment suggests eliminating all unnecessary exposures to chemical and environmental agents that may aggravate the condition. 52 Additionally, there are several highly criti-

45 Berkowitz, supra note 15, at 488. Due to the subjectivity of symptoms,

those who diagnose MCS cannot rule out other possible variables that may have
caused the patients' alleged symptoms. Id.
46

Sparks, supra note 36, at 734.

4'Eric Patterson, When the World Makes You Sick: Researchers Strive to

UnderstandMultiple ChemicalSensitivities, Vegetarian Times, Sept. 1995, at 86.
48 Cullen, supra note 27, at
671.
49 id

50 Id

51Id
52

Ziem, supra note 22, at 76. "Patients with MCS typically improve, albeit

gradually over months or years, with adequate control of their chemical
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cized and unconventional treatments for MCS such as, diet drugs, a
macrobiotic diet and saunas.53 Although many MCS sufferers put
faith4 in these treatments, there is no scientific evidence to back them
5
up.
E. Alternative Names for MCS
The plethora of titles used to describe MCS are consistent with
the elusive nature of MCS. Some examples of these titles include:
Chemical Hypersensitivity Syndrome; Environmental Illness (EI); Environmentally Induced Illness; Environmental Hypersensitivity Disorder; Multiple Chemical Hypersensitivity Syndrome; Toxic Response
Syndrome; and 20th Century Disease.5 5 It is important to be aware of
the different titles for MCS because they are used interchangeably
throughout the literature regarding MCS. Moreover, awareness of
the different titles used to describe MCS is especially important in the
legal community because
MCS claims may be filed under any one of
56
names.
alternative
these

exposures. The focus should be on eliminating all unnecessary exposures to

pesticides, petroleum and coal-derived chemicals, and combustion products." Id
13

Michael Fumento, Sick of it All, REASON, 20, 24 (1996). Some criticized

treatments include, a combination of phentermine and fenfluramine [Phen-Fen], a
macrobiotic diet based on grains and vegetables free of wheat and dairy products,
sauna therapy to "sweat out" toxins, coffee-enemas, salt-neutralization therapy,
gamma globulin, interferon, vitamins, ginseng, and the patient's urine (as a
beverage or injection). Id
54

55

Id.

Albert Donnay, Recognition of Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, MCS

REFERRAL

& RESOURCES, 179,179 (1997). Some of the additional titles for MCS

include: Acquired Intolerance to Solvents, Allergic Toxemia, Cerebral Allergy,
Chemical-Induced Immune Dysfunction, Ecological Illness, Environmental
Irritant Syndrome, Idiopathic Environmental Intolerance or (IEI), Immune
System Dysregulation, Multiple Chemical Reactivity, Total Allergy Syndrome,
Toxin Induced Loss of Tolerance or (TILT). Id
56 Gots, supra note 26, at 112. Other problems which arise when researching
MCS claims are that many claims for MCS type injuries have been filed before
the name MCS was coined, a state may catalogue claims according to alleged
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F.Mixed Acceptance ofMCS in the Medical Field
MCS remains extremely controversial and has not been readily
accepted by mainstream medicine.17 The American Medical Association, (AMA) in a position paper regarding MCS, refused to accept
MCS as a disease. 58 The American College of Physicians is also
skeptical of clinical ecology and MCS.59 Likewise, the American
Academy of Allergy and Immunology believes that the practice of

cause rather than diagnosis, and many MCS claims are at the trial court or
administrative level which tend to be not well catalogued. Id
57 Sanderson v. International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981,
1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
The American College of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine, the American Medical Association, the American
College of Physicians, the American Academy of Allergy and Immunology, and
the California Medical Association have studied this alleged condition and have
concluded that MCS is not a physiological, as opposed to a psychological, illness.
Id.
58 Summers, 897 F. Supp. at 536.
[Nbo scientific evidence supports the contention that MCS is a significant cause of disease or that diagnostic tests or treatments used have
any therapeutic value. Until such accurate, reproducible, and wellcontrolled studies are available, the American Medical Association
Council on Scientific Affairs believes that multiple chemical sensitivity
should not be considered a recognized clinical syndrome.
Id (citing 1992 American Medical Association Council Report on Clinical
Ecology issued by the Council on Scientific Affairs (1992)).
59 Summrs, 897 F. Supp. at 536. The American College of Physicians'
(ACP) 1989 position paper on MCS states that "the literature [on clinical ecology]
provides inadequate support for the beliefs and practices of clinical ecology." Id
Moreover, this position paper proposes that the clinical ecology theory be
questioned because of the lack of a clinical definition. Id. Finally, the ACP feels
that there is no proven diagnosis of nor effective treatment for MCS. Id (citing
the 1989 position paper of the ACP).
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clinical ecology and current treatments for MCS are
too experimental
60
and that MCS sufferers should be informed of this.

There is no clear consensus on MCS in the medical community
and so the debate rages on. Concurrently, the validity of this disease
is being put to the test on the legal front. As in the medical community, the growing awareness about and reception of MCS in the legal
community has been mixed. Thus, the future of MCS as a recognized
illness is uncertain in many arenas.
II. THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD APPLIED FOR
ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING MCS
Litigation asserting that a claimant suffers from MCS requires
her to establish a causal link between the defendant's alleged conduct
and MCS. 6 '

Establishing this connection is particularly difficult in

litigation asserting injuries caused by hazardous substance exposure.62

Summers, 897 F. Supp. at 537. This position was stated in a position
paper issued by the American Academy of Allergy and Immunology (AAAI) in
August of 1986. ld Specifically, this organization criticizes the fact that clinical
ecology is time-consuming and places severe restrictions on the patient's lifestyle.
Id
61 Bradley v. Brown, 852 F. Supp. 690, 696 (N.D. Ind. 1994). "As used
in
negligence law, causation 'is the requirement for a reasonable connection between
a defendant's conduct and the damage which [ ] plaintiff[s] have suffered."' 1d.
(citing Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ind. 1991)). "The
plaintiffs must draw this connection by showing that their injuries were the
'natural and probable consequence' of [the defendant's] negligence 'which should
have been foreseen."' Brown, 852 F. Supp. at 696 (citing Watson v. Medical
Emergency Services, Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1191, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)).
62 Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 696. The Bradley court stresses that drawing a
causal connection in the growing field of hazardous substance litigation is
particularly difficult. Id. Illustrating this connection is especially difficult in
cases where the causal relationship between exposure to a hazardous substance
and subsequent symptoms has only been hypothesized but not yet tested and
proven to a legal certainty. Id
60
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Expert testimony is required to prove this causation.63
The common law rule regarding expert testimony of scientific
evidence proposed to be entered in court requires a showing that the
testimony has reached the level of "general acceptance" in its relevant
scientific community.64 This rule was articulated in the case of Frye
6 and was employed by federal courts throughout
v. United Stateds
66
this country.
In 1993, however, the seminal case of Daubert v.
Merill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.67 modified Frye's strict standard.68 In the years following Daubert,many state courts, including
Massachusetts, lent credence to this decision and adopted Daubert's
reasoning.6 9

In Daubert,the United States Supreme Court held that the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 supercedes the Frye test and the

63

Id The testimony of an expert witness is necessary when the issue of

proximate cause is not one a lay person would understand. Id "The etiology of
MCS, to the extent [that] it is understood at all, must turn upon complex medical
interactions beyond the ken of a lay person, or for that matter the court." Bradley,
852 F. Supp. at 697. "[P]laintiffs may not make out causation vis-A-vis MCS
merely by reliance upon the temporal congruity of the [alleged negligent events]
and the onset of their symptoms." Id
64 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
65 Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
66 See O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1106 (7th Cir.
1994) (stating a majority of federal courts apply Frye to determine admissibility of
scientific evidence).
67 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
68 Id at 593-94.
69 See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994)
(adopting Daubert framework in Massachusetts by stating reliability is the
ultimate test of admissibility for expert testimony); Rotman v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 669 N.E.2d 1090, 1091 (Mass. 1996) (excluding testimony of
neurologist on exacerbation of pre-existing condition will be excluded under
Daubert analysis absent required validating data).
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common law rule for federal courts. 70 The Court concluded that scientific evidence, which was not yet generally accepted in the scientific
community, may be admitted if the trial judge determines, before trial,
that the testimony satisfies a two-prong test. 71 Daubertestablished
the principle that the district court judge acts as a "gatekeeper" in allowing expert opinion testimony to be presented. 72 Thus, the trial
judge is vested with discretion to admit or exclude an expert's testimony. 73 The Court's interpretation of Rule 702 established a broad,
flexible test to help the trial judge determine whether scientific evidence should be admitted.74
The first prong of the Dauberttest requires a district court judge

Daubert,509 U.S. at 590.
71 Id at 588-89; See also FED. R. EVID. 702 which provides: "if scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
72 See, e.g., O'Conner, 13 F.3d at 1106 (stating a trial judge must regulate
theories about which expert may testify); Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 6 F.3d 1233, 1239 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (elimination of formal barriers to
expert testimony merely shifts to the trial judge responsibility for keeping 'junksciences' out of court); Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186187 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding reversible error when trial judge fails to conduct
adequate preliminary assessment of expert's methodology).
73
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592; See also FED. R. EVID. 104 which provides: "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be
a witness. . . or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court ... In making this determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges."; Summers, 897 F. Supp. at
541. "Daubert entrusted the courts to make a 'preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue."' Id. at 541-42.
70

" Treadwell v. Dow-United Technologies, 970 F. Supp. 974, 976 (M.D. Ala.
1997) (citing 509 U.S. at 594-95). "The Supreme Court has stressed [ ] that the
Rule 702 inquiry 'is a flexible one."' Daubet, 509 U.S. at 595.
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to ensure that the proffered testimony pertains to scientific knowledge, thus determining if the testimony is reliable and relevant enough
to be admitted for the jury's consideration. 75 Daubert explained that
"scientific knowledge" requires "a grounding in the methods and procedures of science," as well as a basis for the expert opinion to be
more convincing than a mere "subjective belief or unsupported
speculation." 76 To aid the court in making the admissibility determination, Daubert established a framework to ensure the reliability of
the methodology utilized by the particular field of science.77 The
Daubertcourt noted several factors that the trial judge may take into
consideration when evaluating whether or not the proposed testimony
is based on scientific knowledge:
(1) whether the theory or opinion in question can be (and has
been) tested; (2) whether the theory or opinion has been the
subject of peer review and publication; (3) whether the
known or potential error rate associated with the principal is
excessive; and (4) whether the theory or technique has
achieved widespread acceptance within the scientific community.78
The Court's characterization of the Rule 702 inquiry as a "flexible one" was clearly defined in the United States Supreme Court case
of Kunho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.79 The Kumho court held that the
factors set forth in Dauber, to assess the reliability of proffered expert testimony, are meant to be helpful and do not constitute a defini-

71 Daubet, 509 U.S. at 589. "[Under the rules the trial judge must ensure

that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable." Id
76 Berkowitz, supra note 15, at 485.
77 See O'Conner, 13 F.3d at 1106 (discussing application of Daubeitfactors).
78 Daubeit,509 U.S. at 593-94.
79 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, No. 97-1709, 1999 WL 152455, at *1
(U.S. March 23, 1999).
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tive checklist.80 The Daubertfactors are to be applied in accordance
with the facts of the case and do not all necessarily apply in every
situation.8" Therefore, the Daubert factors which a trial judge is
likely to apply will depend upon the facts of a particular case and how
helpful the factors will be in assessing the reliability of the proffered
expert testimony. 2
The second prong of Daubertrequires the trial judge to inquire
into whether the proffered testimony will assist the trier of fact in determining causation. 3 Specifically, the court "must ensure that the
proposed expert testimony is 'relevant to the task at hand,' i.e. that
it
8i 4
case."
party's
proposing
the
of
aspect
material
a
logically advances
With regard to both prongs of the Dauberttest, the "focus must
be solely on the methodology, not on the conclusion that [the testimony] generate[s]. ' The first prong may be referred to as the "reliability requirement," and the second prong is sometimes known as the
"fit requirement." 86 The general rule is that the plaintiff has the burden to establish admissibility of expert testimony by a preponderance
of proof 87

80 See id at *10 (holding Daubert factors not definitive and a court is not
required to apply all factors in every case).
81 See id at *9 (stating Daubert factors must be tied to the facts of a
particular case).
82 See id. at *10 (holding court should apply Daubert factors which are
helpful to determine reliability of proffered expert testimony).
83 Daubert,509 U.S. at 595.
84 Sanderson, 950 F. Supp. at 992; see also Wilson, 6 F.3d at 1239. "[tjhe
trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to rule 104(a), whether the
expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." (emphasis added) Id
(citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 594-95).
85 See id. (citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 592).
86

Id

87

See, e.g., Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 697 (stating Plaintiffs must establish by

a preponderance of proof the admissibility of testimony); Murphy v. E.R. Squibb
and Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 253 (Cal. 1985) (general rule states burden of proof
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TO MCS

In applying the Daubertstandard to MCS litigation, every federal
court, which has ruled on the issue of admissibility of expert testimony regarding MCS, has found the proffered testimony inadmissible. 88 Additionally, other courts that have failed to reach this issue
have indicated skepticism as to whether MCS is a valid medical condition.89 Many decisions reason that MCS' etiology is still hypothetical and thus unable to assist the fact-finder. 90 Further, the District

rests on plaintiff to establish injuries were caused by defendant's conduct); Sindell
v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980) (defendant's liability rests on
showing by plaintiff that her injuries were caused by defendant).
88 See Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 700 (holding expert testimony regarding
MCS inadmissible); Carlin v. RFE Indus., Inc., No. 88-CV-842, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19035, at *22 (N.D. N.Y. Nov. 20, 1995) (precluding MCS testimony by
expert witnesses); Summers, 897 F. Supp. at 534 (excluding testimony of two
clinical ecologists); Hundley v. Norfolk & Western Ry Co., No. 91-C-6127, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1041, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1996) (noting testimony of
proposed experts did not reach a reasonable level of certainty); Wilson, 6 F.3d at
1233 (holding expert testimony concerning MCS inadmissible under Daubert
test); Sanderson, 950 F. Supp. at 986 (holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate MCS
is a "good science"); Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 980 (excluding part of expert
testimony regarding MCS); Frank,972 F. Supp. at 130 (holding MCS testimony
inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence).
89 See La-Z-Boy Chair Co. v. Reed, 936 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming
district courts failure to admit clinical ecologists testimony regarding MCS);
Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 773, 774 (E.D. Va. 1995) (discussing
controversial nature of MCS).
90 Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 700. "[Tlhe 'science' of MCS's [sic] etiology has
not progressed from the plausible, that is, the hypothetical, to knowledge capable
of assisting a fact-finder, jury or judge." See Carlin, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19035, at *14 (citing Bradley agreeing that testimony regarding MCS is
unreliable); Summers, 897 F. Supp. at 537 (adopting the reasoning of Bradlej);
United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(dismissing clinical ecology as one of four discredited ventures in the area of
scientific expertise).
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Court for the Northern District of Indiana urges that "scientific controversies must be settled by the methods of science rather than by the
methods of litigation." 9 ' Notwithstanding adverse decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony regarding MCS, the door is
not yet closed entirely on this issue. At lease one district court has
recognized that although MCS is not yet an established syndrome or
disease, materials presented by the parties illustrate continuing experimentation involving MCS. 92 This observation illustrates that that
further experimentation and research may lead to the recognition of
MCS as an established illness. 93 Despite this observation, the contested issue regarding MCS in this type of litigation remains whether
the proposed expert testimony is based upon scientific knowledge that
is both
reliable and will assist the fact-finder in reaching a conclu94
sion.
A. MCS and the Scientific Method
When applying the first prong of Daubertto asses the question of
admissibility of expert testimony regarding MCS, a court must first
look at whether the theory or methodology offered by the testimony
has been subjected to the scientific method. 95 This prong of the Daubert analysis encompasses two factors: (1) whether the opinion in
question can be (and has been) tested; and (2) whether the known or
potential error rate associated with the principal is excessive. 96 Determining whether the proposed theory has been subjected to the scientific method is the most important and significant inquiry. 97 The
importance of requiring an expert's theory to have been subject to the

91See Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 700.
92

See Sanderson, 950 F. Supp. at 1002 (citing Carlin, 1995 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 19035, at *18).
93 Sanderson, 950 F. Supp. at 1002; Carlin, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19035, at
*18.
94 Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 697.

9'Id at 698.
96

id.

97 Id.
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scientific method is to ensure that the theory is reliable and not mere
conjecture. 98
1. Is MCS Capableof Being Tested?
The most common test employed by clinical ecologists to diagnosis and treat MCS is provocation-neutralization. 99 This test requires patients who suffer from MCS symptoms to go to a special
isolation unit, one of which exists at Rea's Environmental Health
Center.100 There the patient is cleared of all toxins by fasting.'0°
Once the patient is free of all "toxins," they are injected with a small
amount of test substance until they exhibit a reaction.10 2 The patient
is then cleared of the test substance and tested again by being injected
with a lessening dosages of the test substance until they no longer exhibit a reaction. 0 From this procedure, clinical
ecologists claim to be
1 04
MCS.
with
patient
a
treat
and
able to diagnose
The provocation-neutralization method has been put to the test
and the results are not promising for proponents of MCS.10 5 In a
study which was financed by the Academy of Otolaryngic Allergy and
the American Academy of Environmental Medicine, test subjects

98

Daubert,509 U.S. at 598; Bradley,852 F. Supp. at 698.

Specifically, scientific expert opinion testimony is allowed on the rationale that the expert can tie the facts of a particular case to tested scientific theory. ... This allows the fact-finder to infer that the case before it comports with that theory. ... 'If the experts cannot tie their assessment of data to known scientific conclusions, based on research or
studies, then there is no comparison for the [fact-finder] to evaluate.'
Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 698.
99 Berkowitz, supra note 15, at 485; See also Fumento, supra note 53, at 25.
Berkowitz, supra note 15, at 485.

100
101

Id

102 Id
103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Fumento, supra note 53, at 20.
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were injected with either a placebo or a test substance. 0 6 The chief
researcher conducting this project was surprised when the experiment
subjects reported exactly the same symptoms, whether exposed to the
test substance or the placebo. 107 The
results of this test converted
08
'
skeptics.
into
MCS
some believers in
The adverse results of this experiment lead some in the medical
field to focus on the theory that MCS is a psychological rather than a
physiological condition.' 0 9 A study based on this theory, reported in
the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1990, suggests
that patients diagnosed with MCS suffer from psychological problems."10 Some may query that MCS is psychologically based, that is
that MCS causes the psychological problems; this position is highly
refuted. 1

106 Id.
107

Id. 'Neutralizing' doses of the test substance and the placebo were equally

likely to provide the subjects of the study with relief. Id
108 Fumento, supra note 53, at 26. Don L. Jewett, orthopedic surgeon and
chief researcher on this project at the University of California at San Francisco
stated: "[w]e designed [this study] carefully to convince any skeptics. So when it
didn't work out it clearly showed the methods they [sic] clinical ecologists were
using at that time did not work as claimed." Id. Jewett went on to state that the
clinical ecologists' "basis was the doctor's impressions and I believe that's all
they still use. It's not science." Id.
109 Id.

A study reported in the Journal of
American Medical Association conducted by Donald Black, a University of Iowa
psychiatrist, concluded that individuals diagnosed with MCS were substantially
more likely to have physiological problems than the rest of the population. Black
has found that those diagnosed with MCS may also suffer from depression,
anxiety disorders, and panic attacks. Id. Moreover, Stephen Barrett, a retired
psychiatrist and author, believes that most MCS symptoms are related to the
patient's reaction to stress. Id.
11 Id Donald Black refutes the theory that the psychological disorder many
MCS sufferers face is the result of years of their MCS going untreated by arguing
that MCS patients' psychiatric history usually predates any chemical exposure
which may be causing their condition. Id.
11o Fumento, supra note 53, at 26.
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According to mainstream medicine, MCS is not capable of being
tested for several reasons: "(1) it lacks any established, agreed-upon
definition; (2) it lacks a dose-responsive relationship; and (3) it is
based entirely on subjective data." 112 These factors are illustrated by
the lack of a single definition for MCS and the innumerable symptoms
sufferers seem to experience." 3 Although clinical ecologists have no
doubt that the provocation-neutralization method is the correct test to
diagnose MCS, this claim is unfounded. 114 The lack of agreement on
what causes MCS and the want of a test to diagnose MCS has lead
courts to rule that 5expert testimony on MCS offered to prove causation is unreliable. 1
In the line of cases excluding expert testimony regarding MCS,
the explanation that the presiding trial judge most frequently gave was6
that there was no evidence of an accepted etiology of the illness."
Even proponents of MCS, including well known clinical ecologists,
acknowledge that there is presently no test to determine the cause of
MCS. 117 The absence of a known etiology of MCS further contrib-

112
113

Berkowitz, supra note 15, at 487.
See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (illustrating the lack of

consensus on a definition, name and etiology of MCS).
114 Fumento, supra note 53, at 20; see also Berkowitz, supra note 15, at 485.
"5 Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 700; Summers, 897 F. Supp. at 542; Carlin, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19035, at *16; Treadwell,970 F. Supp. at 982.
116 See, e.g., Summers, 897 F. Supp. at 541 (recognizing plaintiff's failure to
show MCS etiology theories have been adequately tested); Carlin, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19035, at *16 (holding plaintiff failed to establish knowledge and
testability of MCS etiology); Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 982 (expressing its
inability to conclude reliability of MCS etiology).
117 Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 699. William J. Rea, a clinical ecologists and
proponent of MCS, states in his own book that the catalyst which triggers MCS
cannot be ascertained. Id Miller and Ashford postulate that the mechanism for
MCS may not be able to be identified; that is that even after exhausting all
avenues of inquiry there is still no distinct explanation for MCS. 1d; Carlin,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19035 at *11. Dr. Michael B. Lax an occupational
medicine physician, acknowledges the absence of a single test that can identify
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utes to the conclusion that MCS is not testable, and thus fails to satisfy the testability prong of the Daubertstandard.
2. Unknown ErrorRate for MCS Tests
Assuming, arguendo, MCS is sufficiently testable, attorneys litigating this matter face another problem under the Daubertstandard.
Daubert dictates that one factor a trial judge should consider in deciding whether scientific testimony is reliable is the potential for error."8 In discussing the test frequently employed to diagnose MCS,
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that "the
testimony of the witnesses [who were clinical ecologists] affords no
possible basis upon which any such determination [of error rates]
could be made."" 9 This court excluded expert testimony based on
the belief that the potential error rate of the provocation20
neutralization test employed by clinical ecologists is unknown. 1
The trial judge in Bradley, denouncing MCS as an accepted illness, stated that the theory of MCS "is a far cry from the tested hypotheses foreseen as the basis of 'scientific knowledge' testified to
under Rule 702."' 121 The unknown etiology and the absence of a reliable test to diagnose MCS prevents expert testimony regarding this
illness from surviving the testability and potential rate of error factors
set forth in Daubertfor testing the scientific reliability of expert testimony.

any agent that causes multiple chemical sensitivity. Id Lax also recognizes that
the actual workings of MCS is unknown. Id; Summer, 897 F. Supp. at 537. Dr.
Johnson, a clinical ecologist and proponent of MCS, testified that the mechanism
which causes chemical sensitivity is unknown. Id
"8 Daubert,509 U.S. at 594.
119 Hundely, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1041.
120 id
121

Bradley,852 F. Supp. at 699.
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B. PeerReview andAcceptance of the MCS Theory
Peer review is another factor that Dauberturges trial judges to
inquire into when determining whether expert testimony is based on
scientific knowledge.12 The theory behind peer review is that if a
hypothesis is reviewed by others in the field, problems, if any, will be
discovered and remedied. 123 The results of peer review of MCS have
not been favorable. 124 Peer review of the theories surrounding MCS
exposed a multitude of flaws in the theory25 and thus has perpetuated
suspicions regarding the validity of MCS. 1
The most significant evidence of adverse peer review of MCS is
the numerous mainstream medical associations who have taken 126a
negative position on the question of whether MCS is an illness.
Various medical association's views on MCS have been articulated in
numerous position papers offered by the organizations after reviewing
MCS literature. 127 The result of peer review of MCS illustrates

122

Id.; see also Carlin, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19035, at *12.

"Thorny

problems of admissibility arise when an expert seeks to base his opinion on novel

or unorthodox techniques that have yet to stand the test of time to prove their
validity." Id (citing McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir.
1995)).
123 Bradley, 852 F. Supp. at 699. "Peer review is significant under Daubert

because 'scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of "good science," in
part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will
be detected."' Id
124 See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text (illustrating the many
organized medical associations refusing to accept MCS as an illness).
121 Frank,972 F. Supp. at 135.
126 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussing medical

organizations denouncing MCS as a bona fide illness).
127 Frank, 972 F. Supp. at 135.

Several established medical organizations

such as the American College of Physicians (1989), The American Academy of
Allergy and Immunology (1986), the California Medical Association (1986), and
the American Medical Association, through a review of MCS literature, have not
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minimal scientific evidence -- certainly not the widespread acceptance
as required under Daubert 2 Additionally, the field of toxicology, a
resource many claimants rely upon in asserting the cause of MCS, has
failed to recognize MCS as a definable disease. 129 Thus, the failure of
established medical institutions to recognize MCS is a factor weighing
heavily against admitting expert testimony regarding MCS to prove
causation.
C. FatalResults
Exclusion of expert testimony to prove the cause of MCS prevents a plaintiff from establishing the essential causal connection between the alleged negligence had the injury. 130 Thus, the exclusion of
this type of expert testimony is fatal to a plaintiff's claim for MCS
injury. 131

been able to find adequate scientific evidence to validate MCS or to establish a
causal link between MCS and exposure to chemical agents. Id.
128

See id (stating that MCS's status with mainstream medicine does not

reach the level of widespread acceptance).
129 Frank; 972 F. Supp. at 136.
The International Society of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology
has concluded that 'current scientific information reports no clinical,

laboratory, or other objective support for the proposition that MCS represents a clinical definable disease entity. The theories claiming to

unify this condition as a toxicologically mediated disorder transgress
basic principles of toxicology and clinical sciences and moreover the
scientific evidence is lacking.'
Frank,972 F. Supp. at 136.
130 See Wilson, 6 F.3d at 1233 (stating inability of Plaintiffs to show causation
because inadmissibility of expert testimony on MCS); Sanderson, 950 F. Supp. at
1005 (holding inadmissible testimony regarding MCS prevents plaintiff from
stopping summary judgement on issue of causation); but see Bradley, 852 F.
Supp. at 700 (holding although plaintiffs proved connection between injury and
negligence they failed to show existence of MCS);
131

Bradley,852 F. Supp. at 700.
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III. OUTLOOK

A. Limitation ofScientific Evidence By The United States Supreme
Court: GeneralElectric Co. v. Joiner
The United States Supreme Court, in its decision in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner,'32 has made it more difficult for scientific evidence to be admitted in various types of cases, including toxic tort
litigation.' 33 Specifically, the Joinercourt held that there is no precedent in Daubertor the Federal Rules of Evidence that requires a district court judge to admit expert testimony which is linked to previously recorded data solely by the experts bare assertion.3 4 Many
commentators have interpreted the Court's decision to mean that it
will be more difficult for attorneys to have their experts pass the rig35
ors of the Daubertstandard and have experts testimony admitted.1
Moreover, this decision will apply in a wide variety of cases. 13 6 Experts pontificate that this decision reflects the Justices' concern with
removing 'junk science' from the courtroom and the growing problem

"' 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
133 Susan A. Bocamazo, 'Scientific Evidence' is Sharply Limited by US.
Supreme Court,LAW. WKLY USA, Jan. 12, 1998, at 1.
134

118 S. Ct. at 512. "A court may conclude that there is simply too great an

analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Id Justice Steven
disagrees with this requirement "it is not intrinsically 'unscientific' for

experienced professionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available
scientific evidence - this is not the sort of 'junk science' with which Daubert was
concerned." Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135 Bocamazo, supra note 129 at 15. "The ruling 'gives a green light to lower
courts to be very demanding of evidence."'

Id (quoting law professor David

Kaye, of Arizona State University, co-author of treatise on scientific evidence).
"'Evidence that was routinely admitted in the past may have [after this decision]
a hard time qualifying."'

Id

(quoting Edward Imwinkelried, U.C. Davis

professor and co-author of treatise on scientific-evidence).
Id. "'[This decision] applies in every single case where there's any kind of
scientific, technical or specialized testimony."' Id (quoting attorney Marc Kline,
member of the ABA's Counsel on Science and Technology).
136
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of experts relying on accepted tests to have questionable conclusions
admitted as scientific evidence.' 37 Experts believe that this decision
will no longer afford an expert the opportunity to cite a valid study
then give his opinion regarding the results if there is no link between
the valid data and the expert's opinion. 38
'
The most evident effect of this decision will be on plaintiffs, especially in the realm of toxic tort cases. 139 This particular area of law
will be affected because it is plaintiffs embroiled in this type of litigation who are mostly required to rely on novel scientific theories such
as the MCS diagnosis. 140 The new requirement of proving a definitive
link between the proffered expert testimony and the study from which

Bocamazo, supra note 129 at 15. "[I]t now appears that the Justices are
more concerned about removing 'junk science' from the courtroom." Id "Some
experts believe the Court [in this decision] was responding to a growing problem
- the use of legitimate methodologies to get questionable conclusions admitted."
Id
138 Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 520. "This requirement will sometimes ask judges
to
make subtle and sophisticated determinations about scientific methodology and its
relation to the conclusions an expert witness seeks to offer - particularly when a
case arises in an area where the science itself is tentative or uncertain, or where
testimony about general risk levels in human beings or animals is offered to prove
causation." Id (Breyer, J., concurring). Bocamazo, supra note 129 at 15. "A
number of people argue that as long as the technique is valid, any conclusions are
for the jury." Id. (quoting David Faigman, law professor and co-author of
treatise on scientific evidence). "You can't simply cite a study and say, [that]
'[slince the study was valid, my opinion is valid.' There has to be a link between
the data and the opinion." Id. (quoting John Kester, the winning attorney in the
137

Joinercase).

Bocamazo, supranote 129 at 15.
140 " 'The science of whether a particular substance causes injury usually
is
not very well developed at the time people begin to get hurt. Consequently,
plaintiffs are forced to turn to 'not very well developed science.' " Id (quoting
Paul Rothstien, law professor and author of several books on evidence).
139
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the opinion was taken will be costly and time consuming. 41 Additionally, this added requirement may increase the amount of recovery
142
expected for a case to be a viable option for a plaintiffs attorney.
With regard to MCS, this decision may have serious implications
in the future for admission of expert testimony on MCS. As for other
scientific testimony the decision sets forth one more hurdle for plaintiffs attorneys in toxic tort cases to have to cross before expert testimony can be admitted to show causation between the alleged injury
and the chemical exposure.
B. Recognition ofMCS
While MCS has yet to be recognized as an illness by the standards of conventional medicine, MCS has been recognized in a number of contexts. Several federal courts have affirmed MCS (by this or
another name) as a handicap or disability under the Fair Housing Act,
Rehabilitation Act, and the Social Security Disability Act. 143 To date,
According to New Hampshire plaintiff's attorney Anthony Roisman, "[tihe
problem is that [proving the connection between the evidence and conclusion is]
an 'expensive proposition. "' Bocamazo, supra note 129 at 15.
142
"[Allot of smaller cases may no longer be economically viable." Id. "'If
you have a $750,000 injury, the cost of proving it is $250,000 and the chance of
success can't be measured beyond "some lose and some win" there won't be a lot
of people who will take that case."' Id.
143 See United States v. Association of Apartment Owners of Dominis
West,
Case No. 92-00641 (Haw.) 25 August 1993 (requiring, under Federal Fair
Housing Act, management of an apartment complex to accommodate tenants with
MCS); Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982)
(recognizing as a handicap under Rehabilitation Act plaintiff's sensitivity to
tobacco smoke but denying Plaintiff's request for a smoke free environment);
Rosiak v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 679 F. Supp. 444, 449-50 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(recognizing plaintiff's sensitivity to fumes as a disability under the Rehabilitation
Act); Kouril v. Bowen, 912 F.2d 971, 974-75 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding
environmental chemical sensitivity syndrome was serious enough to prevent
plaintiff from returning to work); Slocum v. Califano, No. 77-0298, 1979 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10165, at *10 (D. Haw. Aug. 27, 1979) (in earliest decision
141
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sixteen state court decisions have affirmed MCS as a handicap or injury in cases regarding housing discrimination, employment discrimination, health service discrimination, negligence/toxic torts, the tort of
outrage and deliberate intention exception to worker's compensation
and worker's compensation. 144 Additionally, several worker's com45
pensation boards have recognized MCS as a work-related illness. 1

recognizing MCS, awarding disability benefits to plaintiff who suffers from
chemical hypersensitivity).
144 See Lincoln Realty Management Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 598 A.2d 594, 596 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (affirming hearing
examiner's finding MCS is handicapped under Pennsylvania Human Relation
Act); County of Fresno v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 226 Cal. App.
3d 1541, 1550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming judgement of Fair Employment
and Housing Commission that hypersensitivity to smoke is a physical handicap
under the Fair Employment Housing Act); Kallas Enter. v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n, C.A. No. 14282, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1683, * 5-6 (May 2, 1990)
(holding hypersensitivity to chemicals is a handicap under Ohio Civil Rights
Act); Birklid v. The Boeing Co., 904 P.2d 278, 288-89 (Wash. 1995) (awarding
civil damages and workers compensation benefits to seventeen workers who were
physically and/or emotionally injured (including those with MCS)); Kyles v.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 195 Cal. App. 3d 614, 622 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (recognizing chemical sensitivity as a compensatible disorder); Menendez
v. Continental Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 525, 529-30 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (awarding
workers' compensation benefits to plaintiff with environmental sensitivities);
McCreary v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 835 P.2d 469, 481-82 (Ariz. 1992)
(recognizing MCS as a work related injury compensable under workers'
compensation act); Appeal of Denise Kehoe, 648 A.2d 472, 474 (N.H. 1994)
(holding "MCS syndrome" due to workplace exposure an occupational disease
compensatable under NH's workers' compensation statute); 2nd Appeal of Denise
Kehoe, 686 A.2d 749, 754 (N.H. 1996) (reversing compensation appeals board,
finding both that the claimant had MCS (legal causation) and that "her work
environment probably contributed to aggravated her MCS."); Grayson v. Gulf Oil
Co., 357 S.E.2d 479, 482 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing chemical sensitivity
to gasoline as a work related injury); Saif Corp. v. Scott, 824 P.2d 1188, 1190
(Or. Ct. App. 1992) (holding plaintiff is totally disabled by MCS).
145 See Sinnamon v. Connecticut, Connecticut Workers Compensation Board,
1 October 1993 (holding medical evidence supports diagnosis of MCS ordering
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Although these cases seem persuasive for MCS proponents, none
reach the issue of accepting expert testimony regarding MCS under
the Daubertregime. 146 The trial judge in Frank v. New York

7
urged

that the admissibility of expert testimony regarding MCS under Daubert is a separate issue from determining whether MCS is a disability
under the American with Disabilities Act. 148 While the recognition by
these courts is a step toward universal recognition of MCS as an illness, MCS sufferers still have a long way to go before expert testimony regarding MCS will be admissible to prove causation. Thus,
the recognition of MCS as an illness or handicap by courts interpreting federal statutes will probably do little to persuade trial judges to
accept expert testimony regarding MCS as reliable under Daubert.

payment of temporary permanent disability benefits and treatment for MCS);
O'Donnell v. Connecticut, Connecticut Workers' Compensation Board, 22 May
1996 (recognizing MCS was caused by numerous exposures to pesticides at
work); Martineau v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Case No. 9682387, 15 May 1990,
MA Department of Industrial Accidents (ordering employer to pay disability
benefits and costs for MCS treatment at the Center for Environmental Medicine);
Skeats v. Bringham and Woman's Hosp., Case No. 02698693, 24 October 1996,
MA Industrial Accident Board (ordering employer to compensate employee for
prescriptions prompted by her injury and relative to: intravenous therapy, vitamin
and nutritional supplements, massage therapy, air conditioning, air purification,
air filtration, masking, water filtration, allergy bedding, laboratory testing and
mileage traveled); Elliott v. Lovelace Health Sys., No. 93-17355, 8 November
1994, New Mexico Workers' Compensation Board (finding that MCS was
triggered by glutaraldehyde and sick building syndrome); Crook v. Camillus Cent.
School Dist. #1, No. W998009, 11 May 1990, New York State Workers'
Compensation Board (specifying "modify accident, notice and causal relationship
to multiple chemical sensitivity"); McDonnell v. Honeywell, No. 95 5670, 22
October 1996, WA State Board of Industrial Appeals (recognizing "toxic
encephalo-pathy" as an acceptable diagnosis for MCS-induced permanent partial
disability).
146 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of trial
judges to accept expert testimony regarding MCS).
147 Frank,972 F. Supp. at 130.
148 Id. at 133 n.3.
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C.MCS Acceptance in the PoliticalRegulatoryArena
MCS has been widely recognized in policy arenas. 149 Although
several governmental agencies recognize MCS as an illness, they do
so because claimants are unable to function effectively. 0 The major
federal agencies which recognize MCS as an illness or injury include
the United State Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the Department of Justice and United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 151
The 1991 ADA handbook, jointly published by the EEOC and
the Department of Justice, recognized MCS as a disability under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (Act) and called for workplace accommodations for an MCS sufferer.15 2 The Act defines a person's
disability as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual.' 153 Notwithstanding this recognition, MCS is not specifically noted as a disability within the Act.' 5 4 Thus, claims of MCS as a disability under
this Act are determined on a case-by-case basis using the typical
analysis done for any disability. 55 Since MCS has in some cases been

149 Gots, supra note 26, at 111.
150

Id "While some of the regulations implemented and policy statements

issued provide criteria and terms to define MCS, other regulatory and policy
actions place the affected individuals under their purview, not by the singular
diagnosis of MCS, but rather by virtue of the fact that their ability to function has
been adversely affected." Id.
1 Id at *3; see also Patricia E. Dougherty, Regulatory Action:
UnderstandingMultiple Chemical Sensitivity, APPA, February, 1996.
152 Donnay, supra note 55, at 183.
153 Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102
(1990). The full definition as provided in the Act is as follows: "The term
'disability' means, with respect to an individual- (A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment." Id
154 Gots, supra note 26, at 111.
155 Id
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recognized a disability under the ADA, employers may be faced with
ADA-inspired cases when MCS suffering employees demand accommodations for their illness. 116
Also in 1991, HUD took the position that MCS sufferers are entitled to protection under federal housing discrimination laws. 17 On
April 14, 1992, the Office of General Counsel for HUD released a
memorandum regarding MCS and its recognition as a handicap under
the Federal Fair Housing Act. 158 To come under the protection of the
Federal Fair Housing Act, claimants must show that their impairment
is based upon an actual physical or mental impairment. ' 9 Additionally, claimants must prove that this impairment has the effect of substantially limiting one or more life activities.16 MCS complainants

156 Dougherty, supra note 147, at *2.
157

Gots, supra note 26, at 111; see also Donnay, supra note 55.

HUD

recognizes "'MCS as a disability entitling those with chemical sensitivities to
reasonable accommodation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973'
and also 'under Title VIII of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988."' Id at
182. "MCS and environmental illness 'can be handicaps' within the meaning of
section 802(h) of the Fair Housing Act and its implementing regulations." Id.
"Section 804 (0(2) of the Act provides that it shall be unlawful to discriminate
against any person in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such
dwelling because of a handicap." Marilyn Brown, Establishinga Prima Facie
Case Involving Multiple Chemical Sensitivity 'A Threshold Approach," J.
MARSHALLL. REV. 441, 444 (1996).
151 Memorandum from George L. Weidenfeller, Deputy General Counsel
for
Operations U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, to All Regional
Counsel (April 14, 1992) (on file with HUD). "MCS and [Environmental Illness]
El can be associated with physical impairments which substantially impair one or
more of a person's major life activities. Thus, individuals disabled by MCS and
El can be handicapped within the meaning of the Act." Id
159 Id "MCS complainants must show that their impairment is based upon an
actual physical or mental condition." Id "The Act does not define the terms
physical or mental impairment." Id.
160

Id.
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may prove that they are handicapped under the Act if they denote
their condition as being physiological or psychological. 16' MCS
claimants must also show impairments that are drastic before they will
qualify as a substantial limitation under the Act.162 Therefore, to say
that MCS sufferers can claim handicap under the Federal Fair Housing Act is not without difficulty.
D. Social,Politicaland LegalImplications
of the Recognition ofMCS
Recognition by governmental agencies of MCS as an illness
which has the potential to cause permanent disability has strong implications in the political regulatory arena. 63 This recognition is
likely to necessitate alterations in policies regarding health care coverage, worker's compensation benefit awards, and
the regulation of
64
chemicals in the workplace and the environment. 1
Whether this recognition of MCS by several governmental agencies will inspire trial judges to find expert testimony on this illness
admissible remains to be seen. Since the judge is vested with discretion and has wide latitude as to what is permissible expert testimony,
a persuasive argument that this recognition illustrates the reasonableness and reliability of the MCS diagnosis required under Daubertmay

161 Id.
162

See Prindemore v. Legal Aid Society of Dayton, 625 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.

Ohio 1985) (holding no substantial limitation on a major life activity when
claimants condition did not impair his ability walk and talk); Gomez v.
Department of the Air Force, 869 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to find
claimants hypersensitive to paint fumes substantially limiting because claimant
was not disqualified from other jobs); Wright v. Tisch, 45 F.E.P. 151 (E.D. Va.

1987) (stating that a postal employee who was hypersensitive to dust was not
handicapped because his condition only prevented him from working in unusually
dusty environments). But see Joyner v. Department of the Navy, 47 M.S.P.B.
596, 599-600 (1991) (ruling a Navy employee was limited in his ability to lift,
carry, climb, work on ladders or scaffolding, stoop, twist, bend, push and pull,
thus substantially limited in his ability to work).
163

Sparks, supra note 36, at 735.

164

Id.
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sway a judge to admit the testimony. Without clear word on the acceptance by the medical community through the scientific method, it
is unlikely that the recognition of MCS by these agencies will dictate
a result different from the current line of cases.
E. Research Recommendations
"MCS is rapidly becoming a politically defined illness in the vacuum created by lack of data."'16 5 To avoid this result, scientists urge
that further research on MCS is needed to clarify the etiologic
mechanisms of MCS so the existence of a link between chemical exposure and the illness may be credited or discredited.166 Legislators
and members of the legal profession are mainly concerned that the
lack of evidence on MCS is similar to the asbestos-lung disease controversy which existed several decades ago. 167 Thus, the medical field
feels it is critical to obtain the medical data necessary to define MCS
and decipher its relation to chemical exposure. 6 Further, obtaining
this data must be done quickly before "medical science becomes irrelevant to the diagnosis, treatment and social policy decisions relat69
ing to MCS.'

1

V. CONCLUSION
What lies ahead for MCS sufferers depends upon research and
tests performed by the medical community. The position the legal
community takes on emerging sciences mirrors the position of the
medical community. Unless clinical ecologists can lessen the skepticism trial judges have as to the testability, definition and cause of
MCS, the Dauberttest is likely to continue to preclude proffered expert testimony regarding this illness. Considering that Daubertis the
least stringent standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, state
courts that employ the Frye test are more than likely to exclude this

166

Sparks, supra note 25 at 728.
id

167

id.

168

id

165

169 Id. at 728-29.
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type of testimony, at least in the near future. The courts' recognition
of the continuation of experimentation on MCS illustrates that if pro-

ponents are able to show promising evidence, judges may be willing
to exercise their discretion and admit expert testimony on MCS.
A First Circuit court, if faced with a claim for MCS, may be inclined to follow the existing line of cases regarding this issue. The
First Circuit is likely to be persuaded by the strong language used by
the federal courts regarding the unreliability of MCS testimony.
Likewise, state courts who have adopted the reasoning of Daubertare
also likely to follow the federal line of cases and refuse to admit expert testimony on MCS to prove causation.
In conclusion, the future of MCS in the courtroom lies in the
hands of the researchers of the medical profession. Future research
must decipher the inconsistencies surrounding MCS and derive a singular test, definition and etiology for MCS before it will be accepted
by mainstream medicine and the legal community.
Amy B. Spagnole

